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ii

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/ Appellee,
v.

Case No. 20050671-CA

FREEDOM YOCUM,
Defendant/ Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals from a conviction of one count of aggravated assault, a
third degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-103 (West 2004).
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West
2004).
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1. Did the trial court's management of the exhibits and brief questioning
of defendant create an appearance of bias against defendant?
Because defendant did not object below, he must demonstrate that the trial
court committed plain error. See State v. Beck, 2006 UT App 177,1f 9,551 UT Adv.
Rep. 6.

2. Alternatively, was defendant's trial counsel ineffective for failing to
object to the trial court's actions?
"'Where, as here, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is raised for
the first time on appeal without a prior evidentiary hearing, it presents a
question of law.'" State v. Atkin, 2006 UT App 155, \ 6, 550 Utah Adv. Rep. 8.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
This case does not require the interpretation of any particular
constitutional provision, statute, or rule.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The State charged defendant with one count of aggravated assault, a third
degree felony. R.l. A jury convicted defendant as charged. R.151. The trial
court sentenced defendant to serve zero to five years in the Utah State Prison, but
suspended that sentence and placed defendant on probation for thirty-six
months. R.158.
Defendant filed a motion for new trial arguing that the trial court's
"comments concerning not allowing the defendant to demonstrate what
occurred using the garden tool exhibits impinged on his presumption of
innocence and deprived him of due process and a fair trial." R.165. After
hearing argument on the motion, the trial court denied it. R.202-03 (a copy of the
trial court's ruling denying the motion for new trial is included as Addendum
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A). The trial court ruled that defense counsel failed to object at trial, and, in any
event, the trial court did not deny defendant the opportunity to demonstrate
with the exhibits because he never requested the opportunity to do so. R.202-03.
Defendant timely appealed. R.208.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
An unneighborly disagreement
On 15 March 2004, Richard Matsumura was using a pair of garden shears
to cut weeds near his backyard when defendant approached him and exclaimed,
"Give me the money, you mother fucker/7

R.224:13-14, 15. Mr. Matsumura

understood defendant to be referring to approximately $80 that defendant
believed Mr. Matsumura owed him for allegedly damaging defendant's tiller
three years earlier. R.224:15-16, 21. Defendant was carrying a three-pronged
garden cultivator with a four and a half foot long handle. R.224:17,19,69.
Apparently not waiting for a reply, defendant attacked Mr. Matsumura
with the cultivator by raising it and swinging it downwards towards Mr.
Matsumura's head about four or five times. R.224:17, 34. Mr. Matsumura held
his shears above his head trying to protect himself. R.224:17, 19, 34. One of
defendant's blows struck Mr. Matsumura on the inside of his right arm,
puncturing and lacerating it. R.224:17, 44. Eventually, Mr. Matsumura saw a
truck approaching and alerted defendant that "there might be some witnesses
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there."

R.224:21, 34-35.

This distracted defendant long enough for Mr.

Matsumura to retreat behind his fence, return to his home, and call 911.
R.224:21-22,35.
Police responded quickly.

R.224:29.

Officer Todd observed that Mr.

Matsumura's shirt was torn and his upper right bioep was injured. R.224:42.
Mr. Matsumura's home surveillance video cameras captured part of the
altercation. R.114, 224:22-24; State's Exhibit 3. The video depicts defendant,
carrying a long-handled garden tool, approach Mr. Matsumura from across a
street, raise the tool, and attempt to strike Mr. Matsumura while Mr. Matsumura
holds his shears over his head and retreats. State's Exhibit 3. It then shows a
truck driving on the road where he altercation occurred. State's Exhibit 3.
Defendant's version
Defendant claimed that he was raking and cleaning up near the road when
he saw Mr. Matsumura. R.224:59-60. Defendant "called [Mr. Matsumura] a few
names," including "pervert."

R.224:60, 61.

Defendant explained that Mr.

Matsumura then came after him with his garden shears and defendant simply
tried to avoid Mr. Matsumura.

R.224:61-62.

Defendant then grabbed the

cultivator and threw it into Mr. Matsumura's yard. R.224:61-62.
When defendant's counsel suggested that the video seemed to show more
than what defendant had described, defendant explained, "Well, I just picked it
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up, you know."

R.224:63.

Defendant's counsel then asked whether Mr.

Matsumura swung his shears at defendant. R.224:63. Defendant replied, "Yeah.
Kind of, well, it happened so fast, you know."

R.224:63. Defendant also

explained that he remembered shaking the cultivator at Mr. Matsumura while
saying "stick this up your ass," or "I ought to stick this up your ass," and then
throwing it into Mr. Matsumura's yard and walking away. R.224:64. Defendant
admitted that he shook the cultivator at Mr. Matsumura but testified, "I didn't
hit him, didn't plan on hitting him." R.224:64.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.

The trial court did not plainly err in managing the exhibits and

questioning defendant. The trial court did not deny defendant the opportunity
to demonstrate with the exhibits because defendant never requested the
opportunity to do so. The trial court's management of the exhibits did not
obviously create an atmosphere of bias because the trial court's actions were
motivated by legitimate safety concerns, not prejudice towards defendant.
Additionally, the trial court's brief questioning of defendant appropriately
allowed him to clarify his testimony.
Even if the trial court's actions amounted to obvious error, the error was
remedied by the jury instructions. Additionally, given the evidence in this case,
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including a videotape of a portion of the assault, any error does not undermine
confidence in the verdict.
II. Defendant's ineffectiveness claim fails for lack of prejudice because any
error was harmless based on the jury instructions and the videotape of the
assault.
ARGUMENT
I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT PLAINLY ERR IN
MANAGING THE EXHIBITS AND BRIEFLY QUESTIONING
DEFENDANT
Defendant claims that the trial court "creat[ed] an atmosphere of bias that
had the effect of undercutting his presumption of innocence/' Aplt. Br. at 16. He
asserts that the trial court did so in two ways: (1) by encouraging the victim to
use the exhibits for demonstration purposes but "forbfidding] the defendant
from handling any of the same exhibits; and (2) questioning] the defendant and
accus[ing] him of making a threat against the victim/' Aplt. Br. at 11. Defendant
claims that the trial court's actions "creat[ed] a clear implication to the jury that
he —as opposed to the victim—was dangerous and not to be trusted." Aplt. Br.
at 15-16. Defendant claims that the trial court's actions amounted to plain error.
Aplt. Br. at 11,17.
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A. Factual background.
At trial, the state admitted as exhibits Mr. Matsumura's garden shears, and
a garden cultivator that Mr. Matsumura believed was the same one defendant
used to attack him. R.224:17-19; State's Exhibits 1 & 2. During Mr. Matsumura's
testimony, he raised the shears over his head to demonstrate how he had
defended himself against defendant's attack.

R.224:19.

During cross-

examination, defense counsel asked Mr. Matsumura to describe the angle at
which defendant held the garden cultivator. R.224:32. After defense counsel
posed the question, the trial court interjected, "Why don't you let the witness
demonstrate?" R.224:32. Mr. Matsumura then demonstrated how defendant had
held the cultivator. R.224:32.
After the State rested, defense counsel called defendant as a witness.
R.224:58. The trial court directed defendant to come forward and be sworn.
R.224:58. The trial court then stated: "Where are the pieces of equipment? I'd
like them put on my clerk's desk. I'll have the bailiff move them, or you can
move them if you want Mr. Heineman. Mr. Yocum, you need to stop where you
are and be sworn in."1
During defendant's direct examination, counsel referred to the garden
tools, but did not ask permission to have defendant demonstrate with the tools.

1

Mr. Heineman was defendant's counsel. R.224:l.
7

[MR. HEINEMAN:] Okay. So, you said those things to him, what
happened at that point?
[DEFENDANT:] Well, he—he came after me with the shears like
this and he had a—
[MR. HEINEMAN:] Okay. When you say 'Tike this", you have to
talk about it in words, so that when it's—
[DEFENDANT:] Well, he had a pair of shears, a red pair of shears
like this one here, and the red handle—
THE COURT: You hold them, Counsel.
MR. HENIEMAN: What's that?
THE COURT: You hold them.
MR. HEINEMAN: Oh.
THE WITNESS: (Inaudible) he had there. A (inaudible) it was a lot
bigger.
R.224:61-62.
Later, but still during defendant's direct examination, the trial court briefly
questioned defendant regarding an ambiguity in his testimony.

[DEFENDANT:] And I had the (inaudible) the van sitting out, I
said, stick this up your ass and stuff like that, you know.
THE COURT: And what were you referring to?
THE WITNESS: Pardon?
THE COURT: What were you referring to?
THE WITNESS: That claw thing.
8

THE COURT: You had that claw thing?
THE WITNESS: Yeah. And in order t o THE COURT: And you threatened to THE WITNESS: I - n o , I wasn't threatening him. I was saying, I
ought to stick this up your ass, you know, again, and just took it and
threw it in his yard and walked off.
THE COURT: I see.
THE WITNESS: That's the only thing I did that I remember.
MR. HEINEMAN: Okay.
R.224:63-64.
Defendant did not object to any of the trial court's comments or
questioning at trial.
At the close of the evidence, the trial court gave the following jury
instruction:
7. In determining any fact in this case you should not consider nor
be influenced by any statement made or act done by the court which
you may interpret as indicating its views thereon. You are the sole
and final judges of all questions of fact submitted to you, and you
must determine such questions for yourselves from the evidence,
without regard to what you believe the court thinks thereon. The
court has not intended to express, or intimate, or be understood as
giving any opinion on what the proof shows or does not show, or
what are or what are not the facts in the case. In any event, it is
immaterial what the court thinks thereon. You must follow your
own views and not be influenced by any perceived views of the
court.
R.123; 224:96.
9

After sentencing, defense counsel filed a motion for new trial alleging that
the trial court had denied him his right to a fair trial because, "[a]s defendant.. .
was taking the stand in the presence of the jury, the trial court commented that
he was not to be permitted to demonstrate using these exhibits during the course
of his testimony/7 R.161.
At the argument on the motion for new trial, defense counsel argued that
although he had not reviewed the videotape or a transcript of the trial, his
recollection was that the trial court said, " [defendant] is not to handle the—the
tools or the garden implements/' R.226:5. Defense counsel further explained
that "[a]t that particular time, it was clear to me that the Court did not want
[defendant] handling the tools and I wasn't intending on having him do that/7
R.226:6.
Defense counsel also explained why he did not object at trial. R.226:7. He
stated, "I thought if I objected at that time, any admonition the Court would have
given just would [have] stressed the point and would have left it in the jurors7
mind and I don't think it would have cured any of the damage caused by the
[statement]/7 R.226:6. Defense counsel later reiterated, "I thought an objection
would just further prejudice the jury and would not be in my client's best
interests at that particular time/7 R.226:9.
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During argument on the motion for new trial, the trial court commented
on the need for a contemporaneous objection, stating:
But you can't correct the fact that you did not raise the issue at trial.
Had you raised the issue at trial, I could have dealt with the issue at
trial. You do not put a loaded firearm in front of the defendant and
leave it there throughout the trial. A claw that could have been used
to hit me in the face, it was a very long rake, with claws at the end, is
not something I wanted sitting in the courtroom on the witness
stand for the duration of the trial. I viewed it as a dangerous
weapon. And hence, asked to have it moved over, with all of the
other exhibits, in front of my clerk.
R.226:6-7.
The trial court denied the motion for new trial. R.202-03 (Addendum A).
The trial court found that defendant was not denied any opportunity to
demonstrate using the exhibits because defendant never asked for such an
opportunity.

"[T]here was never a request by the defendant or counsel to

demonstrate with the tools during the trial/7 R.202. The trial court also found
that, because the garden tools could be used as dangerous weapons, "care was
taken without prejudice or d[ef]erential treatment to the defendant/' R.203.
B. The trial court did not plainly err.
Because he did not object at trial, defendant asserts that the trial court
plainly erred in managing the exhibits and briefly questioning him at trial. Aplt.
Br. at 11. "To establish plain error, a defendant must demonstrate that '(i) [a]n
error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the
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error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more
favorable outcome for the [defendant], or phrased differently, our confidence in
the verdict is undermined/ ,, State v. Beck, 2006 UT App 177, % 9, 551 Utah Adv.
Rep. 6 (quoting State v. Casey, 2003 UT 55,1f4l, 82 P.3d 1106). Defendant has not
satisfied this standard.
"It is well established that '[a] principal ingredient of due process is that
every criminal defendant is entitled to a fair and impartial trial/"

State v.

Mitchell 824 P.2d 469, 473 (Utah App. 1991) (quoting Kennedy v. Cardwell, 487
F.2d 101, 107-10 (6th Cir. 1973)). Therefore, "a court may not comment on the
weight of the evidence presented at trial or comment on the merits of the case in
such a way that indicates a preference toward either party." State v. Alonzo, 973
P.2d 975, 980 (Utah 1998) (citing State v. Larson, 775 P.2d 415,419-20 (Utah 1989)).
Rule 19(f), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure states that "[t]he court shall not
comment on the evidence in the case, and if the court refers to any of the
evidence, it shall instruct the jury that they are the exclusive judges of all
questions of fact." Utah R. Crim. P. 19(f).
As for questioning witnesses, rule 614(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, provides
that "[t]he court may interrogate witnesses, whether called by itself or by a
party." Utah R. Evid. 614(b). Therefore, this Court has held that '"[i]t is within
the judge's prerogative to ask whatever questions of witnesses as in his judgment

12

is necessary or desirable to clarify, explain | | ,»i ,nM In ilv nvidenre as il relales lo
the disputed issues/'' Beck, 2006 UT A r p I/"7 1 1 0 (quoting State v. Nichols 2003
n

I

\pp 287, « r

e\i

>,- o: ... 5 right to question a witness, the judge should not indulge in

e**-*!-

6 P.3d 1173). However, '"[i]t is generally held that in the

*

..*

.

«..^L.oiivi

2003 U I / j : r ^™* * * t

v)unsti

• (quoting Y/V/MN

, . : . . .

public uonfideii^e in die xc-*-'

\ ston

*

*

r>me am* Miumlani

*

-c

maintain the appearance of impartiality, especially injury trials." Id

!

,

Defendant's claim that the trial court's management of the exhibits created
an appearai ice of impartiality rests on his assertion that "the trial court "forbade
tin1 nioioitilanl Ii'inii Ik null il if; ilm

inhibits "'" \pji, Ui.at I I

assertion is not supported i , ibe mi m I

However, that

Neither delondant, nor Ins counsel,

ever requested the opportunity for defendant to < lemons Irate M "'h "R" e^ hih'K
R.202; 224:61-62.
Moreover, at .;.<• hearing :-r» the motion ror no * trial, :iu .i.ja
.• *
defendant's *;;..

-iii;"'o

u)

ad

d r e s ^ at t r H anv issues arising >>o

-• J. ^ • •, >

,, ; l t i l , ourt explained \n

defense counsel that, "[h]ad } * * • - - *
the issue at hial/ r

R.226:7.

^^t

N o t h i n g in the aio

indicated a complete unwillingness to allow defendant to demonstrate

13

exhibits. Therefore, contrary to defendant's characterization, the trial court did
not create an appearance

of impartiality

by "forbidding"

him

from

demonstrating with the exhibits.
To the extent that defendant argues that the trial court's general
management of the exhibits was improper, he fails to demonstrate obvious error.
Any error that arose from the trial court's general management of the exhibits
was not "obvious" to the trial court because, as the trial court ruled in denying
the motion for new trial, its actions were based on legitimate safety concerns, not
prejudice toward the defendant. R.203.
The trial court was legitimately concerned about allowing defendant to
wield the cultivator on the witness stand.

The three-clawed, long-handled

cultivator could have been used as a dangerous weapon. The trial court also had
credible evidence from the videotape that defendant had indeed used the
cultivator as a dangerous weapon. Furthermore, as the trial court noted at the
hearing on the motion for new trial, the court would have been within range of
the cultivator had defendant wielded it while on the witness stand. R.226:7. The
trial court was therefore legitimately concerned about allowing defendant
unfettered access to the cultivator.

Because legitimate safety concerns, not

prejudice against defendant, motivated the trial court's request to have the
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exhibits moved, any error that may have arisen from the trial court's actions was
not obvious.
With respect to the trial court's questioning, defendant has not
demonstrated any error because the questions were brief and appropriately
clarified defendant's testimony. The trial court asked a mere four questions.
R.224:63-64. These questions allowed defendant to clarify his testimony by
explaining that he was referring to the cultivator when he told Mr. Matsumura to
"stick this up your ass." R.224:63-64. Although the trial court asked whether
defendant was making a threat when he made that statement, the question
allowed defendant to dispel the notion that he was threatening the victim.
Defendant explained, "[N]o, I wasn't threatening him. I was saying, I ought to
stick this up your ass, you know." R. 224:64.
In Beck, this Court held that a trial court's extensive questioning of a
defendant was improper.

2006 UT App 177 at ^

12-13. In reaching that

conclusion, this Court noted that the case was complex and "much depended on
the credibility of the witnesses." Id. at ^f 12. This Court also noted that "the trial
judge extensively questioned Defendant twice," and that the questioning
"appeared to be adversarial and to challenge Defendant's credibility." Id. at f <f
12,13.
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In contrast, this was a simple case that was not a mere credibility contest,
given the physical evidence, and the videotape of the assault. Additionally, the
trial court asked a mere four questions that did not challenge defendant's
credibility. Rather, the questions allowed defendant to clarify his testimony,
including the fact that his statement was not intended as a threat to Mr.
Matsumura. Therefore, the trial court's questions here were not improper.
In sum, neither the trial court's management of the evidence, nor its brief
questioning of defendant created am obvious appearance of impartiality.
Consequently, defendant has not demonstrated that the trial court plainly erred.
C. In any event, any error was harmless.
In any event, even if defendant has demonstrated obvious error, he has not
demonstrated harmful error. An error is harmful if, "absent the error, there is a
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the [defendant], or
phrased differently, [this Court's] confidence in the verdict is undermined."
Beck, 2006 UT App 177. There was no such error in this case.
Generally, a jury instruction directing the jury to disregard the trial court's
comments and actions is sufficient to remedy any perception of judicial bias that
might arise during a trial. See State v. Parker, 2000 UT 51, f 8, 4 P.3d 778 (holding
that even if the trial court's comments on the evidence were error, the error was
harmless in light of the jury instructions). Such an instruction was given in this
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case. R.123: 224:96. The trial court instructed the jury that it "should not
consider nor be influenced by any statement made or act done by the Court
which you may interpret as indicating its views thereon/7 R.123; 224:96. The
instruction also informed the jury, "[y]ou are the sole and final judges of all
questions of fact submitted to you and you must determine such questions for
yourselves from the evidence, without regard to what you believe the Court
thinks thereon/'

R.123; 224:96.

This instruction remedied any improper

impressions that might have been created by the trial court's actions in this case.
See Parker, 2000 UT 51 at f 8.
Defendant argues that Parker is distinguishable because there, the trial
court commented on the evidence, but here, the trial court's actions and
comments expressed "her opinion as to the parties." Aplt. Br. at 17. Defendant
fails to explain, however, why a trial court's comments on the parties should be
distinguished from comments on the evidence. Both types of comments would
presumably have the same potential to improperly influence a jury. Therefore,
an instruction similar to the one given in Parker would be sufficient to remedy
any improper impressions whether arising from a comment on the evidence or
the parties.
In Beck, this Court held that such an instruction was insufficient to remedy
the impression of judicial favoritism in that case. 2006 UT App 177 at f 14.
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However, the trial court's actions in Beck were far more pervasive and pointed
than the trial court's actions in this case. For example, in Beck, "the trial judge
twice subjected Defendant to extensive questioning" which "appeared to be
adversarial and to challenge Defendant's credibility." Id. at W 13, 14. The
questions emphasized the weaknesses of Beck's case and "would have given the
jury the impression that he considered her testimony doubtful."

Id. at \ 13.

Additionally, Beck was a complex case where "much depended on the credibility
of the witnesses." Id. at \ 12.
In contrast, this was a simple case were credibility determinations were
easily resolved by reviewing the videotape of the assault. Moreover, unlike the
trial court in Beck, the trial court's actions here were neither repeated, extensive,
nor adversarial. Therefore, the instruction here was sufficient to remedy any
impression of judicial favoritism.
Even if the instruction alone was insufficient, the trial court's actions still
do not undermine confidence in the verdict because the evidence conclusively
demonstrated defendant's guilt.
videotape.

State's Exhibit 3.

A portion of the assault was captured on
The video showed defendant approach Mr.

Matsumura from across a street with a long-handled garden tool, raise the tool,
and attempt to strike Mr. Matsumura. State's Exhibit 3. It also showed a truck
drive along the road where the attack occurred. State's Exhibit 3. The video
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corroborated Mr. Matsumura's testimony and refuted defendant's testimony.
When the instruction is considered in light of the evidence in this case, especially
the videotape, defendant cannot demonstrate that the trial court's actions
undermined confidence in the verdict. See Beck, 2006 UT App 177 at f 9.
IL DEFENDANT'S
TRIAL
COUNSEL
WAS
NOT
INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO OBJECT TO THE TRIAL
COURTS ACTIONS
Defendant argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object
to the trial court's actions. His claim fails for lack of prejudice.
"'To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, [defendant]
must show that (1) trial counsel's performance was objectively deficient and (2)
there exists a reasonable probability that absent the deficient conduct, the
outcome would likely have been more favorable to [Defendant]."' State v. Atkin,
2006 UT App 155, Tf 6 (quoting State v. Medium, 2000 UT App 247, \ 21, 9 P.3d
777). '"[I]n cases in which it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the
ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, [this Court] will do so without addressing
whether counsel's performance was professionally unreasonable/"

State v.

Malaga, 2006 UT App 103,111,132 P.3d 703 (quoting State v. Strain, 885 P.2d 810,
814 (Utah App. 1994)). This Court should follow that course in this case.
Regardless of whether defendant's counsel performed deficiently in failing
to object, defendant cannot demonstrate that he suffered prejudice. As explained
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above, the jury instructions were sufficient to remedy any impression of judicial
favoritism in this case. See Parker, 2000 UT 51 at % 8. Moreover, given the
evidence in this case, most notably the videotape, the trial courts actions do not
undermine confidence in the verdict. See Beck, 2006 UT App 177 at ^ 9.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm defendant's conviction.
Respectfully submitted

( June 2006.
MARKL.SHURTLEFF
Utah Attorney General

CHRISTOPHER D. BALLARD
Assistant Attorney General
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Margaret P. Lindsay
99 East Center Street
PO BOX 1895
Orem, UT 84059-1895
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Addendum A

FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

JUN 2 9 2005
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF* UTAH R„
Deputy Clark'

State of Utah

MINUTE ENTRY RULING

vs
Yocum, Freedom

CASE NO 041901738
JUDGE LESLIE A LEWIS

The Court having heard arguments on the Defendant's
Motion for New Trial on 6/22/05. The Court has taken the
opportunity to review the video of the testimony of Mr Yocum
at the time of trial.
The Court orders the motion for new trial is denied.
Counsel for the defendant never made any objections to the
handling of the exhibits during trial, there was never a
request by the defendant or counsel to demonstrate with the
tools during the trial.
The Court merely asked at the end of the State's case to
have the "equipment" placed with the other exhibits in front
of the clerk.
When Counsel for the defendant asked leave to show the
tools (long sharp pointed shears, and a long, heavy iron clawlike rake) the Court allowed this. The Court instructed
counsel to take the exhibits and hold them as he showed the
defendant. There was not a request by counsel to have the
defendant demonstrate how the tools were used and in fact the
defendant denied that the tools were the same tools.
The Court indicates there is no plain error or prejudice.

The Court treated these exhibits (the tools) as any other
exhibits by placing them in front of the clerk, and by asking
that they be held by counsel, since no demonstration was
requested and these were the alleged weapons used in the
aggravated assault.

As with any other dangerous weapons or

implements, care was taken without prejudice or differential
treatment to the defendant. The defendant was not deprived of
a

demonstrative

opportunity.

One

was

never

requested.

Finally, Counsel made no record of his concerns by registering
any objections.
ED THIS 28nd DAY OF

AMMSI I
HONORABLE L e w i s A L e w i s
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